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BACKGROUND
This report delivers the highlights of work American Technology Alliances
(AmTech) undertook between October 1995 and September 1996 pursuant to a
Cooperative Agreement with Dryden Flight Research Center. The
Cooperative Agreement called for continuation and expansion of the Joint
Sponsored Research (JSR) Program activities at DFRC, specifically the ERAST
Alliance, which is implemented through a JSR Agreement.
Pursuant to the Cooperative Agreement, AmTech's work focused on four
main areas of investigation:
(1) Research issues arising from the implementation of the ERAST
Alliance;
(2) Research issues regarding legal, intellectual property, financial, non-
technical-management, and public policy to improve procedures and
guidelines for use of the JSR Program;
(3) Research and test partnership facilitation techniques aimed at
increasing R&D productivity and financial leverage, with particular focus in
the areas of importance to the ERAST Alliance; and
(4) Examine and foster the commercialization elements of the ERAST
Alliance activities.
A summary of activities and results in each of these areas is provided below.
1.0 ISSUES ARISING FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF ERAST ALLIANCE
1.1 Overview
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The ERAST Alliance gave rise to issues in two primary areas. The first area
concerns methods to increase R&D sharing and productivity among Alliance
members who, though normally business competitors, are induced to explore
the benefits of collaboration in the limited context of the ERAST Alliance.
These issues are discussed below in 1.2 and 1.3. The second area concerns
interpretations of the ERAST JSR Agreement pertaining to rights and
responsibilities of ERAST Alliance members and policies and procedures
required to operate a dynamic alliance involving multiple participants.
These issues are discussed below in 1.4 and 1.5.
1.2 Financial Incentive for Program Performance
A Category B (i.e., principle company) member proposed the use of a
financial bonus to incentivize company performance. The proposal raised
both legal and pragmatic considerations investigated by AmTech.
On the legal side, AmTech's research did not reveal any government
regulatory prohibitions against the use of a financial bonus under a JSR
Agreement. However, there were concerns raised regarding whether this
method of encouraging performance, ie., offering a reward for particular R&D
outcomes, was allowable under a JSR Agreement, due to the somewhat
specific nature of the JSR Agreement as contracting instrument. The ]SR
Agreement is a specially delineated class of NASA Space Act agreements. The
NASA Administrator's delegation of authority concerning JSR Agreements
characterizes the type of activity for which the JSR Agreement may be utilized
as an "applied research project for the purpose of transferring existing or
resulting technology for private sector use". Further, the delegation expressly
prohibits use of the JSR Agreement "for the acquisition of property or services
for the direct benefit or use by the United States Government." Some worried
that the act of fixing clear-cut performance milestones and offering a financial
reward for achieving them would make the activities indistinguishable from
the government's normal business of proscribing and bargaining for specific
results under a contract, thus prohibited by the authorization for JSR
Agreements.
AmTech's research and analysis included discussions with the DFRC legal
counsel and the ERAST Project Manager. AmTech's assessment is that a
financial incentive for achievement of particular outcomes would not
compromise the unique nature of the JSR Agreement because other
characteristics of the JSR Agreement plainly dist_guish it from procurement.
Those other characteristics include the means of establishing milestones
jointly between government and an industry group, the industry cost-sharing
contribution, the lack of profit for industry, and the requirement that industry
principals share project data.
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Despite the lack of legal prohibition against it, AmTech raised pragmatic
concerns regarding use of financial incentives. AmTech reviewed both
human resources and employment compensation literature on salary
incentives to identify their benefits and drawbacks in affecting group
behavior. The literature showed that incentives, when used thoughtfully, are
effective in incentivizing individual performance. However, they have the
countervailing effect of causing competition between individuals. AmTech
expressed reservations about introducing an element into the ERAST
Alliance that could possibly reduce the emerging group cohesion among
member companies, even if it otherwise resulted in outstanding performance
for one high performing company. AmTech's literature research was
summarized and is presented in Attachment 1.
1.3 Business Models for Group Development of Aircraft
In late 1996, ERAST Category B members began discussions concerning the
joint design, fabrication, and testing of a new unpiloted aircraft capable of
meeting certain performance parameters. In addition to the technical
considerations required, the members discussed what form of business model
would best suit such a collaborative undertaking. One notion was the
formation of a formal legal corporation owned on a fractional basis by each of
the four main players. The members required further information about this
business model.
AmTech commenced this research by identifying a successful model which
could serve as an operational example for the ERAST members to study and
consider. AmTech choose a seminal example from the aeronautics field,
Aerobus Industrie, SA, because it is a corporation owned and managed by a
relatively small number of majority shareholders, engaged in work similar to
that contemplated by the ERAST members. The research into Aerobus is
summarized and presented in Attachment 2.
1.4 Rights to Tangible Property
One ERAST member required interpretation of Articles 24.01 and 24.02 of the
ERAST JSR Agreement. Article 24.01 holds that the government has the
right to take title to property purchased with government funds at the end of
the JSR Agreement. This provision seemingly conflicted with Article 24.02
which provides that property developed by a company with government
funding remains the property of the company. The issue raised was who-the
company or the government-would own an item containing a mixture of
property, some purchased and some developed by the company. More
specifically, who would own an item, such as an unpiloted airplane, that was
constructed by the company from raw materials purchased with government
funding, and which may include some off-the-shelf goods purchased with
government funds?
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Based on analysis and discussions with the DFRC legal counsel, AmTech
provided clarification of the ERAST JSR Agreement. AmTech advised the
member company that Article 24.01 applied to purchases of end items and not
items utilized as components of larger systems developed by the company.
Thus, Article 24.02 pertains to items developed by the company, which may
include components purchased with government funds. The test as to
whether a piece of purchased property falls within 24.01, and therefore may be
owned by the government, or within 24.02, and is therefore owned by the
company, turns on whether the purchased article has lost its separate identify
due to integration into property developed by the company.
1.5 Sales and Use Tax Exemption
A Member company inquired as to whether its purchase of materials required
to fabricate an aircraft under the ERAST program would be exempt from
California State sales or use tax. AmTech researched California law, and
discussed the issue with the DFRC legal counsel before issuing a response.
The Memo summarizing AmTech's legal research and opinion is presented
as Attachment 3.
1.6 Overtime for Alliance Members
Alliance Members requested clarification concerning their ability to pay
employees overtime on ERAST work. Working with the ERAST Program
Manager, it was determined that overtime would be an allowable expense.
This determination was based on the rationale that budget allocations to
Alliance Members are fixed annually, thus Alliance Members have discretion
as to how to expend their budget allocation in order to accomplish agreed
upon tasks.
2.0 PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE JSR PROGRAM
2.1 Overview
Procedures for improving the operations of a JSR Program, such as the
ERAST Alliance, were a major focus of AmTech's work. New members and
activities were added to the ERAST Alliance, requiring procedures for
expanding the membership and scope of work. As the ERAST Alliance
matured into its second full year of operation, expectations for seamless
financial transactions and project tracking increased both on the part of the
NASA ERAST Program and the members. The specific areas of focus are
described below.
2.2 Member Additions and Deletions
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During the period of the Cooperative Agreement, AmTech developed
procedures to incorporate four new members into the ERAST Alliance,
including two small businesses, one university, and one consultant. Three of
the new members joined established membership categories (two joined
Category C, one joined Category E). One member fit none of the established
membership categories and caused the formulation of a new membership
procedure. This procedure involved creation of a special "Workshop and
Special Projects" category, as well as the attendant contractual agreement
necessary to connect the party to the ERAST Alliance.
At the same time, AmTech established the procedure by which two members
of the ERAST Alliance, one Category C and one Category E member, separated
from the ERAST Alliance and continued their activity under a separate JSR
Agreement.
2.3 Improvements to Financial Management and Project Tracking
AmTech's responsibilities included the administration of ERAST funds to
nine Alliance members and tracking of dissemination of project progress.
These specific attributes were enhanced:
(1) Task and Funds Mods--A major precept of the JSR Program has
been that the NASA Program Manager obtains greater control and flexibility
in project management by maintaining direct authority over contracting
decisions and utilizing the Facilitator as a key component of financial
management. This contrasts with NASA's traditional contracting method,
where the Program Manager is disassociated from contract management,
relying instead on NASA contracting and financial management officers to
administer the contract and funding. A key finding regarding Alliances is the
more complex environment caused by multiple partners undertaking
interlocking work results in relatively frequent need for modifications to
statements of work and funding allocations. These adjustments proved easy
to accomplish with the unique JSR Program administration system. By
developing a simple written instruction form, known as the Business Plan
(BPMod), AmTech could receive instructions from the Program Manager to
immediately implement modifications to members' work plans or budgets.
Based on AmTech's recommendation, the NASA Program Manager reduced
from thirteen to five the number of ERAST tasks and this substantial change
was rapidly implemented through the BPMod system.
(2) Expenditure Verification-AmTech developed a system for
rapidly reconciling monthly invoices received from Alliance members and
obtaining NASA Program Manager authorization for payment. Invoices are
carefully reviewed for accuracy, and any irregularities are brought to the
Program Manager's attention. The time period from receipt of invoice to
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payment of funds through the HHS (Health and Human Services) was
substantially reduced (by approximately two weeks) by development of this
system.
(3) Budget Status Reports--In response to the need for closer
financial analysis, AmTech developed and regularly produced types of
financial report. One type, a monthly budget report, is provided to the NASA
Program Manager semi-monthly, showing budget vs. actual expenditures for
each task, remaining funds balance per task and for the Program, and the
percentage of funds disbursed to date. The report also shows the cumulative
total of invoices received to date and the amount of each company invoice
received. Alliance Members were provided quarterly reports showing all of
their respective invoices paid during the quarter and a their actual
expenditures compared with the budgeted amount.
(4) Financial Forecasting Tool--AmTech developed a spreadsheet
program that permits the NASA Program Manager to visualize the flow of
funds over the annual period and model possible funding modifications.
(5) Pro_e_s Reports--AmTech implemented procedures that
provide the NASA Program Manager with GANT chart information, plotting
Members' milestones over time. Monthly progress reports are regularly
disseminated to specified Alliance Members.
3.0 PARTNERSHIP FACILITATION
3.1 Overview
During the 1995-1996 timeframe, AmTech worked closely with the Sensor
Element Manager of the ERAST Alliance on methods to increase information
sharing among leaders in various subject matter areas. In addition, AmTech
focused on means of increasing compatibility and information sharing
among Alliance members.
3.2 Sharing Among Subject Matter Leaders
AmTech supported three two-day technical workshops on various topics of
importance to ERAST: (i) Sensor Miniaturization; (ii) Propulsion; and (iii)
Data and Communications. The support included full planning and staffing
of events.
3.3 Sharing Among Alliance Members
AmTech supported two ERAST Business Meetings, with full planning and
staffing of events. AmTech sponsored special segments of the Business
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Meeting geared to increasing rapport and enthusiasm for partnering between
Members.
3.4 Testing the Value of the Alliance
AmTech interviewed Members of the ERAST Alliance to ascertain their
views concerning the value to them of working coUaboratively under a JSR
Agreement. AmTech interviewed the NASA Program Manager and Category
B Members. The key finding is that each Alliance Member acknowledged an
initial sense of reluctance to share information with other Alliance Members
but reported that, over time, this hesitation was being overcome by a
recognition of the benefits to be gained from collaboration. Further,
numerous Alliance Members endorsed the Alliance as an important new way
of doing business. Excerpts from AmTech's interviews are presented as
Attachment 4.
4.0 COMMERCIALIZATION
4.1 General
AmTech supported commercialization of the ERAST Alliance technology
through three primary areas, described below.
4.2 ERAST Alliance Exposure
AmTech assisted in efforts to increase public awareness of the ERAST
Alliance, the current capabilities of its Members, and the potential civil and
commercial uses of ERAST unpiloted aircraft. In particular, AmTech worked
closely with Alliance Members to develop presentational materials for an
ERAST booth, which was displayed in three conventions during the period of
the Cooperative Agreement.
4.3 Multimedia Presentation
AmTech proposed the development of multimedia materials to portray
various aspects of the ERAST Alliance to enhance commercialization.
AmTech developed a draft video product (draft script presented as
Attachment 5).
4.4 Hurricane Task Force
AmTech worked closely with ERAST Alliance Members on investigating a
possible commercial application of unpiloted aircraft for hurricane tracking.
(Briefing presented as Attachment 6). AmTech's initial efforts developed into
a long-term ad hoc committee of the ERAST Alliance. Various business
models and potential clients have been identified.
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SUMMARY
AmTech's investigations under the Cooperative Agreement demonstrate the
multifaceted aspects of a major project operating under the NASA JSR
Program. The research reveals that Alliance Members, i.e., participants in a
JSR project, report considerable and unexpected value from working in a
collaborative manner with each other and with the government. The
research also shows the flexibilities in agreement administration permitted by
the JSR Agreement are highly useful to supporting collaborative work, which
by its nature is complex and subject to modification. Additionally, AmTech's
research reveals the kind of policy and procedural issues and determinations
that are required to maintain an operational Alliance. Finally, AmTech's
work highlights the commercialization possibilities of unpiloted aircraft
technology, and suggests a course of action for building commercial and civil
customers for ERAST technologies.
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ATTACHMENT 1
MEMO
RE: Summary Of Literature On Incentives
I. PROS
The articles mention a number of reasons why employers offer incentives to
their employees. These reasons include: Improved quality of work; Enhanced
effort; Increased productivity; Motivation; Recognition for excellent work;
Increased opportunity; Employee focus; Competitive edge in the industry.
The following are some hints in creating a successful incentive program:
- People view the achievement of objectives as "what is in it for me".
The program must offer people a reason to remain committed and involved
in the process over a period of time.
- Open communication to increase employee awareness of the
company's needs and how they can have an impact.
- Assure the same opportunity for all.
- Clear and easy to understand system of rewards.
- Clearly defined and measurable goals.
- Tie payment to performance so that individuals will relate closely to
the success of the company.
- Focus on future goals rather than rewarding improvement over past
performance.
-The system should encourage initiative, decision-making, ingenuity
and aggressiveness.
11. CONS
- Incentives do not encourage and reward coordination and teamwork.
- Incentives make others who have not attained the goals feel
inadequate.
- Discord is created through internal competition. This means that
companies are creating the obstacles to their own success.
- Employees are tempted to conceal problems in order to appear in
control of the situation. They will refuse to ask for help from others.
- When the rewards run out, people revert to their old behavior. The
key is to alter attitudes which will provide long term results.
- There are studies that show less employee productivity when rewards
for production and efficiency are offered.
- In a survey of what matters to employees the most, pay usually
ranked fifth or sixth.
- If compensation is below normal then people are disgruntled which
affects their productivity. However, if compensation is far above average then
there is no sign of higher quality work.
- Incentives are manipulative which is bad for morale over time.
UI. CONCLUSION
The bolded findings strongly suggest the use of financial incentives within
the ERAST Alliance may have unintended negative effects of reducing team
cohesion and overall group performance.
ATTACHMENT 2
RE: Airbus Industrie
I. Introduction
This memo will examine the organization and structure of Airbus Industrie (AI), the
world's second largest manufacturer of large aircraft. AI was formed under French law on 12-18-
70 as a Groupement d Int6r& _conomique (GIE) and is headquartered in Toulouse, France. AI is
currently owned by A&ospatiale of France (37.9%), Deutsche Aerospace of Germany (37.9%),
British Aerospace of the U.K. (20%) and Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. of Spain (4.2%).
Under a GIE each member maintains its separate corporate identity while working with the
organization. The members are essentially subcontractors who bid against each other for the fight
to design and manufacture the various aircraft components at their own factories and then ship
them to Toulouse for final assembly. This places the members in competition with each other, but
it was believed to spark creative tension between them which would generate innovative and
effective solutions to technical and commercial challenges.
AI was to assume leadership and coordination of specified aerospace projects and
derivatives of the members. This includes design, development, certification, manufacture,
marketing, product support, maintenance and all related activity. AI hoped to introduce a
commercially attractive product that would combine the talents of each member while assuring that
the interests of the consortium's members are served as completely and equitably as possible.
II. Background
In order to understand the choice of organizational structure and operational procedures
designed to meet AI's objectives, it is necessary to examine the context in which AI was
conceived. AI was formed by France and Germany in response to U.S. dominance of the
aerospace industry after World War II. The aerospace industry was seen as crucial to the national
interest of European countries for military and economic policy reasons. The aircraft manufacturers
in Europe discovered that they could not compete against the resources of the U.S. individually so
the industry leaders concluded that it was necessary to collaborate The nature of the connection
between state and industry in post World War II Europe allowed the interested countries to back
the project financially in order to get new projects up and running and attract customers. In June,
1971 the relationship between the companies and their governments and the terms on which
development was to take place were elaborated in a "Convention Cadre." It stipulated that each of
the member countries would enter into a national f'mancing agreement with its manufacturing
company, and that each of the companies would in turn enter into an industrial agreement with AI.
A compelling rationale was needed to justify the expense, risk and frustration inherent in collective
action and American dominance of the aerospace industry was it.
III. Choice of Entity
The initial problem was how to form an organization that would be able to respond to
market conditions quickly and efficiently despite cultural, language and distance barriers. Each
country had differing views on how to structure AI. The German contingent wanted limited
liability. They were a group of independent flu'ms who wanted protection from AI's creditors. The
French contingent wanted each company to be liable in order to show potential customers that AI
was committed to the venture. The French were government owned and backed (93% owned by
France with the remainder being held by a private holding company) so they were not as concerned
about liability. They felt that unlimited liability backed by intergovemmental agreements against
defaultwouldprovideconsumerconfidencein AI which would attractcustomersdespitethe poor
trackrecordof largecollaborativeefforts.
Anotherconcernof both countries was the potential of having its companies controlled by
foreign interests. One member in a collaborative effort usually takes a leading role and winds up
dominating the enterprise. With these considerations in mind, the members finaUy agreed and
formed a GIE under French law with Adrospatiale and Deutsche Airbus being the initial partners
with equal shares.
A GIE is a business organization that permits fin'ms to integrate their activities in certain
domains while preserving their individual identities. A GIE is an unlimited partnership in which the
partners are corporations. But even though the partners remain separate corporate entities, they are
responsible both individual and collectively regarding the obligations incurred through their shared
business venture. Creditors are therefore able to take action against an individual member if they
fail to get payment from the GIE itself. (No such case has ever arisen, but this could in theory
make membership of the GIE unattractive to a partner who had only a small share i.e. Spain with
its 4.2% share).
AI was set up so that new members are admitted, and member's rights are adjusted, with
the unanimous consent of existing members. Unanimity is also a requirement for the assignation of
membership rights to third parties or other members. It is also dictated that no member may
withdraw before the company has achieved all of its objectives and performed all of its obligations.
A new member assumes liability not only for future debts but also for any that already exist, and a
member that formally withdraws remains liable for any debts existing on the effective date of its
withdrawal.
Other salient features of a GIE include the absence of tax liability on the GIE itself and no
proprietary capital of its own. Costs, revenues, losses and profits flow though to the partners and
any taxable consequences are borne by the corporations under the laws of the state under which
they are incorporated. The accounts of a GIE can be thought of as a sort of internal ledger in which
there is a record of its revenues and expenses and of its transactions with its members. The
financial status is reflected in the accounts of the individual members of the consortium. Industrial
and financial results of GIE activity are considered an integral part of the partner's overall business
activity and need not be accounted for or reported separately. This makes it very difficult for
outsiders to get detailed information concerning the GIE's operations. Its accounts are subject to
external audit, but not to any form of compulsory publication or general disclosure to third parties.
This privileged status continued even after 1985, when the rules governing all regular French
companies, public or private, were revised and the publication of annual financial statements was
made a legal requirement.
A GIE is managed by one or more directors nominated by the members in a general
meeting. In dealing with third parties, a director binds the GIE by any act within its corporate
objectives and that any limitation of a director's power is invalid against third parties.
The flexibility of the GIE is well suited for international ventures in which firms not
interested in merger wish to coordinate activities with others while avoiding the sunk costs and tax
consequences of an incorporated joint venture. The GIE is specifically aimed at making it easier to
set up cooperative ventures by endowing a GIE with full corporate personality and legal capacity
while providing substantial flexibility in matters of organization and administration.
IV. Original Organizational Structure
The 1970 agreement contained regulations which established the organizational structure of
AI. AI was to provide effective oversight of all phases of the project and would deal exclusively
with all third partiesi.e. new customersand major subcontractors.Atop the structurewas the
Assemblyof MembersandthencametheSupervisoryCouncil andtheManagingDirector.
TheAssemblyof Members consisted of two representatives from each partner and its vote
was required on important matters such as new programs, modification of the statutes of the GEE,
admission of new members or anticipated liquidation of the venture. The Supervisory Council
consisted of five members from both partners who were appointed for five year terms. The
Managing Director was appointed by the Assembly of Members in a general meeting for a period
of five years. This established a separation of powers over the operations of AI between the
Supervisory Council and the Managing Director.
The Supervisory Council's role was to supervise the operation while the Managing Director
had the power to implement decisions. The Managing Director was to carry out the objectives of
the GEE, attend the Supervisory Council's meetings and to make sure the directives of the
Supervisory Council were realized. The Managing Director had authority over the major areas of
operation i.e. technical, production, administration, finances, marketing and after-sales service.
Each of these areas had its own director who was designated by the Managing Director with the
approval of the Supervisory Council.
AI was structured this way in order to share the power between the Supervisory Council
and the Managing Director, making each reliant on the other for its actual exercise. There was great
potential for gridlock in such divided authority so the regulations also included explicit provisions
for resolving differences among the partners such as procedures, timetables and the appointment of
an outside arbitrator to settle disputes.
The structure proved to be very inefficient. AI evolved into seven products, four partners,
two associate members and an international network of subcontractors. The decision-making
process was time consuming and full of bureaucratic red tape. It was especially difficult to get new
projects moving forward. There were four different governments and partners pulling in different
directions and domestically each has to operate in different political climates. AI had achieved a
substantial market share, but it was not making a profit so AI was reorganized in 1989 which will
be discussed below.
V. Operations
In order to foster the creative tension that was essential to making the collaboration work,
competition between members was woven into the fabric of the organization. The bids each
member makes for a component must specify the precise materials, cost and delivery schedule a
member can provide. The other members then closely examine the submitted bid and question it
extensively. AI acts like an arbitrator in these meetings as the members battle back and forth
seeking to get the best price for themselves while keeping it low enough to be accepted by the
group.
This creates a paradoxical situation as the partners essentially act as the prime contractors to
an entity of their own making. The result of this situation is that members have interests that
coincide and conflict. They each want the costs to remain low so that AI does well, but they also
want the maximum possible income for themselves. Partners play roles that are cooperative and
adversarial. Everything is questioned so it forces each partner to improve itself and thereby AI. On
the other hand, members are unwilling to reveal new methods of efficiency because they would be
forced to reduce their bids and would be giving their trade secrets to the competition.
After the launch of a program, AI allocates research and development activities in
accordance with the member's percentage of ownership. Development and other nonrecurring
costs i.e. engineering and tooling, are negotiated with the members and allowance is made for a
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marginof profit. A portion of thepriceagreed for nonrecurring costs is recovered by the members
with each shipset delivered. Production work also has to be allocated and the members quite often
subcontract their accepted bids to others. Complete subassemblies are manufactured in each of the
four partner companies and are then flown to Toulouse for final assembly, AI taking title from the
member companies when the subassemblies are en route to France. AI then sells the aircraft,
provides pilot and crew training, insures the availability of spare parts and develops maintenance
procedures and literature.
AI is in essence a management company, responsible to the partners for resolving problems
that relate to the total program, but it has a number of activities in its own hands under the
industrial agreements with the members. Market studies, aircraft sales and financing, supervision
of design and development and contract administration were all retained by AI, as were advertising
and public relations. It was also determined that certain functions relating to production were best
performed at the center. Engine procurement fell into this category as well as flight testing and
aircraft certification. Certain operations in the technical area were also retained, such as the
publication of technical materials and spare parts and maintenance support.
This system has been criticized for causing over management; that the nature of the
partnership not only adds a tier to the management structure of the consortium, but also adds to the
high costs of the corporate bureaucracy that had emerged at Toulouse.
VI. Financial System
As noted above, AI does not have one set of books for the entire operation since it is a GIE
whose activities do not have to be reported apart from the members. The prices charged by the
partners provide the basis of an invoicing system linking AI to the partners. AI keeps a detailed set
of accounts for itself and each of the partners which tracks delivery of components and the
disbursal of funds. Invoices are reconciled every ten days and moneys are either allocated to or
requested from the partners with the balance going to the purchase of large items sourced from
outside i.e. engines and overhead expenses. At the end of the financial year, AI divides a profit or
loss according to the member's share of AI.
AI receives funding through several sources. It receives payments from members on a
budget proposed by AI and approved by the Supervisory Council. These payments provide for the
purchase of major equipment and overhead. Nonrecurring development costs and production
funding are borne by the members. Once the member's bid is accepted it is individually responsible
for producing that component. Each member is also required to finance the research development
of those components. This is usually no problem since the members have financing agreements
with their respective governments.
In order to ensure an equitable distribution of government resources, the interested states
work with each other to provide the appropriate funding. This ensures that no single member can
dominate AI by being provided with inordinate amounts of capital from its home country. Towards
that end the states initially signed a memoranda of understanding which committed them to the
project in broad terms and then entered into intergovernmental agreements which govern the
contribution each state makes to project development.
VII. Reorganization
AI was not being run as a corporation out for profit. AI's objective when it was created
was to compete with the Americans. They simply wanted to produce and sell large numbers of
aircraft with little regard to AI's operational efficiency. The members were backed by financing
agreements with their respective governments so there was little concern about lack of capital. In
April of 1988 a commission was formed to review the structure of AI. The commission issued a
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detailedreportwhichconcludedthattheadministrativebody was too big to operateefficiently and
thatthefinancialsystemwas problematicbecauseof the absenceof a consolidatedbalancesheet
showing the financial status of the entire operation. The commissionset forth a number of
suggestionsonhow to improveAI.
The commissionidentifiedseveralproblems that were attributedto a lack of adaptability
andorganizationalinefficiency.Thefirst problemwas that therewasalack of correlationbetween
themarketingof the aircraft andthefinancialaspectsof theprograms.This was attributedto the
fact that sales and support were essentiallyan AI responsibility, whereas the four industrial
partnersnegotiatedprices amongsthemselves,but kept their costshidden.Secondly, it notedthe
absenceof anoverall balancesheetat theAI level which meant that both AI and the governments
lacked what they termed "objective decision-making criteria." Thirdly, it remarked on the
proliferation of committees within AI and the general unwieldliness of the organization, observing
that the rule that required decisions to be backed by shares representing 81% was the equivalent of
a unanimity requirement which made for a very time consuming ratification process. (The 81%
requirement was instituted with the addition of new members into AI.)
The commission stated that "What is required is an AI structure which would be more
responsible for all parts of the programs, more concerned with profit and loss, and less dependent
in its day-to-day operation on each industrial partner. The partners, on the other hand, need to
control more closely Ars decisions, since they bear all the risks."
The question of structure was paramount. The commission wanted to set AI up as public
limited company (PLC), but it concluded that it would take a long time and would pose thorny
problems of valuation and capitalization considering the mix of private and state owned companies.
Given the present level of AI activity, it would also be difficult to envisage an immediate pgsitive
cash flow, and that implied that for some years it would be necessary to make injections of capital.
To pave the way for a transition to PLC status, it would be necessary to devise an
improved management structure to enable the consortium to compete successfully in the market
place. This required that relationships between the partners and AI become simplified and
streamlined so the commission issued a number of recommendations.
The fh:st area addressed was the Supervisory Board which had grown to 20 members. It
met roughly twice a year and its main function seemed to be to ratify decisions made elsewhere. It
recommended that the Supervisory Board should become the main instrument of policy of the
consortium as a whole by playing a more dominant role in decisions about programs, cooperation
agreements and strategic control not just in Toulouse, but in the partner companies. It should be
reduced in size to consist of only five members, the president of AI and the presidents of the four
partner companies. If the occasion demanded, it ought to meet on an ad-hoc basis and dispatch
urgent business and to make that easier, alternates should be appointed and given authority to
speak for their companies.
The commission recommended that the Supervisory Board should meet at least four times a
year and should be involved with all matters relating to the launching of new programs and the
subsequent decisions of work-sharing. Major decisions about new programs (or the cancellation of
existing ones) should be made on the basis of partnership shares and require a 75% vote in favor;
other major decisions should be on the basis of a simple majority of partnership shares; all other
matters should be determined by a simple majority between the presidents.
The commission also recommended that an Executive Board be created in order to manage
the day-to-day operations of AI. In order to provide the most effective representation, the
commission recommended that the Board consist of a senior manager from each of the members
and three representatives of AI (the Managing Director, the Finance Director and a commercial
5
officer). Thepartnerswereurgedto appointastheir representativethemostseniormanwithin their
companieswith day-to-dayresponsibilitiesfor AI activitiesandtoregardthemasplenipotentiaries.
The ExecutiveBoard shouldhold monthly meetingsand in the absenceof a consensus
shouldgenerallyreachdecisionsby a simplemajority vote. An exceptionto this was madein the
caseof certaindecisionswith financialconsequencesfor the companies,and here at least two
partnerscontrollingat least51%of thesharesmustbe in favor.
Thenext areathecommissionexaminedwas finance. The centralaccountingof AI was
restrictedto themanagementaccountsof AI in Toulouse which coveredonly the salesandservice
functions.TheAI books of partnerswere not open either to their fellow partners or to AI. The
report recommendedthat a financialofficer be appointedto makea more rationale accounting
system.For thef'mancialofficer tobeableto carry out therole envisagedfor him, it seemedto the
commissionthatit would benecessaryto establisha centralaccountingsystem comparableto that
existingin theheadoffice of aPLC.
It wasrecommendedthatthefinancialofficer shouldheadanaccountingfunction separate
from anyother centraladministrativewithin AI. The accountsof the membersand of AI itself
shouldbemadefully availableandtheofficer should havefull controlover all cash-flows within
AI.
Theappointmentof aFinancialDirector who was to haveaccessto all thebooks was met
with great animosity from the members. The members do not want anyone from AI examining
their books for fear that it would put them at a disadvantage when they are negotiating for prices
and feel that internal information could be used against them in the bidding process.
Another issue was that of employment structure. It had been a system of temporary tkansfer
from the partners to AI. This was thought to result in a lack of commitment with prime loyalties
remaining with the parent companies. The commission wanted to see the introduction of
employment contracts directly with AI. They believed that this would lead to the evolution of a
career structure and that this would be good for morale and foster a strong spirit of cooperation.
The commission also wished to see an end to the practice of reserving certain key positions
within the consortium for individuals of specific nationality; hiring and promotion, especially of
high-level executives, should be based on merit alone.
The commission made a number of other recommendations on specific f'mancial and
management issues. The partners try to ensure that their share of work is at least equal to their
partnership share in the consortium so that any losses incurred as partners could then be made
good by profits earned as subcontractors. This leads to a lot of side deals which hurt AI as
contracts are not going to the best supplier on many occasions. The commission recommended that
in the future, profits and losses should be apportioned in accordance with the partners' invoiced
work-share and not in proportion to their partnership shares.
Another issue was the way in which funding for modifications was provided. All
development work took place at the partners' factories and the funding for it came from the
partners or their governments. The inflexibility that this gave rise to had led to a good deal of
frustration and the commission recommended that the Supervisory Board should make a certain
sum of money available (a figure of 5% of total development funding was suggested) so that
modifications could be developed to solve design problems as they arose and on the initiative of the
Executive Board.
Subcontracting was another area in which there seemed to be a need for greater flexibility.
The commission urged the introduction of a system that, while guaranteeing each company
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subcontract work up to an agreed proportion of its partnership share, would leave the rest to be
awarded by the Executive Board on a competitive basis. This could greatly enhance the cost
efficiency of AI.
Another recommendation related to export credit. The existence of four separate corporate
credit agencies in the member countries resulted in inefficiency and delay and put AI at a
disadvantage in competing with the Americans. They recommended the creation of a European
import-export bank to provide full credit facilities comparable with those available in the United
States.
AI acted upon the commission's report and on April 1, 1989 AI reorganized its structure in
order to give AI a more streamlined decision making process so that AI could react swiftly to
market developments. The Supervisory Council was reduced to five total members. An Executive
Board was established to control the day-to-day operations and beneath it are senior vice-presidents
in charge of various functions i.e. commercial, engineering, technology. A Financial Director was
appointed in order to review the accounts of AI and the members, but there has been little success
in his attaining the records of the members as of 1995 due to their desire for financial secrecy in the
bidding process. Other recommendations have been established or are still being analyzed.
VIII. Conclusion
The organization, structure and context in which AI was formed makes it a unique entity.
The success of the international industrial collaboration that was initially formed by France and
Germany to meet the challenge of U.S. dominance of the aerospace industry has been remarkable,
but the policies of a "Fortress Europe" have played a key role which must be considered when
evaluating how AI was able to succeed when so many other coUaborative efforts have failed.
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ATTACHMENT 3
MEMO
SUBJECT: Sales and Use Tax Exemption
I. ISSUE
The question is whether an ERAST Member company's purchase of property
necessary for fabrication of an aircraft built pursuant to the ERAST JSR
Agreement is exempt from California State sales or use tax.
II. ANALYSIS
California law provides an exemption from sales and use tax for purchases
made by agents of the U.S. government (i.e., contractors) acting on behalf of
the government. A critical determining factor is whether title to the
purchased property will ultimately rest with the government. The law
provides for an exemption from sales and use tax if title to purchased
property vests with the government. Much of the law in this area deals with
when title vests with the government, and how to ascertain this if the
contract between the government and its purchasing agent (the contractor) is
silent on who will take title and when.
The following case law and regulations clarify the rules pertaining to various
fact patterns:
According to Lockheed Aircraft v. State Board of Equalization (1978) 81 Cal.
App.3d 257 [146 Cal.Rptr. 283], an exemption from sales and use tax is allowed
if title to the purchased materials vests with the government. The exemption
applies even if legal title is vested with the government but possession of the
materials remains with the company who purchased them.
California Revenue and Sales Tax Code 6381 provides the exemption for
purchases of property made by U.S. Government contractors under
government supply contracts. A U.S. Government supply contract is defined
as a "contract with the U.S. to furnish, or to fabricate and furnish, tangible
personal property including ships, aircraft..., whereby title to tangible
personal property purchased for use in fulfilling the contract passes to the
U.S. pursuant to the title provisions contained in the contract before the
contractor uses the property to perform the function or act for which the
property was designed or manufactured. Cal. Code Regs, tit. 18 §1618 (a)(1).
Further, the exemption applies to "supplies, tools, or equipment consumed in
the performance of a contract which are specifically identified to the contract
and the actual cost of which is charged as a direct item of cost to the specific
assertion of title to the aircraft, irrespective whether the aircraft were in the
possession of the government or the Company who developed it.
ATTACHMENT 4
THE BENEFITS OF PARTNERING
Statements from the participants of the ERAST Alliance
TOM CLANCY, ERAST PROJECT MANAGER
AURORA FLIGHT SCIENCES
The whole idea behind ERAST is that we have an agreement that allows us to
share data, share our ideas in a way that's not competitive to each other and it
turns out to be very constructive for the industry that is trying to develop these
unmanned aircraft for various reasons.
DOUG SHANE, ERAST PROJECT MANAGER
SCALED COMPOSITES
I've been able to pick up the phone and call a colleague at AeroVironment,
Aurora and General Atomics, and research a problem, find out what their
experiences have been, and been able to solve problems much more quickly than
otherwise we would have been able to do. I think its really been one of the best
things about the Alliance.
JENNY BAER-RIEDHART, NASA PROGRAM MANAGER
ERAST PROGRAM
We're actually looking at leveraging the partnership activity in a Joint
Sponsored Research Agreement, and that in itself is a real experiment and a
challenge, because what you do is ask competitive companies to work together
and share information for the good of the group, and also asking the
government to step back, not in a leadership, writing the requirements role, but
as far as a supportive role in the industry in developing these technologies.
There's a real paradigm shift that has to be done on this Program, and I think
we've seen that and are working with it each day.
BURT RUTAN, PRESIDENT
SCALED COMPOSITES
Working with the ERAST Alliance, we've been able to share ideas relative to
flight control concepts, we've been able to share hardware development,
including flight control hardware, and also propulsion technologies, and also
our approaches to the ground station are ones that we've been able to pass on to
our other teammates.
JEFF SPITZER, ERAST PROJECT MANAGER
GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS
There's a lot of technology being shared and leveraging of technologies between
the companies.
JOHN LANGFORD, PRESIDENT
AURORA FLIGHT SCIENCES
The Alliance is an unusual experiment in how you take a fundamentally free
market system and make it cooperative in a way that preserves the
competitiveness of each of these four companies involved here...they are arch
enemies of each other in one respect, they compete against each other, and yet
they are all very small players in the world of aerospace and the question is, how
do you grow the next generation of aerospace companies? It's an important
thing for the country's economic development, you don't want the government
making choices about who is going to be a winner and a loser, you get money but
you don't, those are decisions you want the marketplace to make. The U.S. has
to find innovative ways to help grow the next generation of the aerospace
industry. ERAST is an important innovative experiment in that direction.
RAY MORGAN, VICE PRESIDENT
AEROVIRONMENT, INC.
The Alliance has provided a unique opportunity for competitors in an industry
that is noted for 'not invented here syndrome' to share information for mutual
benefit...it is a rebirth of the old traditions that made the United States a world
leader in the aeronautical arena...
ATTACHMENT 5
ERAST SCRIPT
I. INTRODUCTION
VO: Antarctica. It was a dangerous mission, but we needed to know
the truth. Far above the icy waters, a pilot, alone in his plane, gathered the
evidence that brought shocking news to the whole world: a hole in the ozone
layer above Antarctica. Although very risky for the pilot, flights would
continue for a ten year period, from the 1980's into the 1990's. The data was
essential, and there was no other way to collect it.
Pilot Jim Barriolleaux flew most of the antarctic flights,
jeopardizing his own safety because of the importance of the scientific
mission:
BARRIOLLEAUX: The polar missions have the most risk. Sometimes we
constrain missions to maximize the chances that something won't go wrong,
and keep the mission relatively simple to prevent any errors occuring that
would put the pilot in a position that ultimately led to departure of the
airplane, because now you're in a survival kind of scenario.
We don't consider an ejection, or at least, once you arrive on the surface,
whether that be on the water or the ice, to be survivable.
1I EKAST ALLIANCE
VO: The need to understand changes occuring in the earth's
atmosphere is with us, today. More flights are required. But the flights are
dangerous, and safeguarding the pilot places inherent limits on the science
missions. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
NASA, proposed utilizing an unusual kind of airplane, one without a pilot.
Called a RPA, for remotely piloted aircraft, the airplane's pilot remains on
solid ground and controls the airplane's flight through radio transmitted
commands.
NASA decided to launch a new effort in 1994, aimed at perfecting UAV's for
high altitude scientific missions. NASA named this effort, the
environmental research aircraft and sensor technology alliance, which is now
known simply as the ERAST Alliance.
NASA's ERAST Program Manager, Jenny Baer-Riedhart, explains:
JENNY: The goals of the ERAST Program are to develop technologies
through flight demonstrations of very high altitude remotely piloted aircraft
so that they can be used as sensor platforms for scientific missions...
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propeller driven by a supercharged engine. For range and endurance, the
engine is airbreathing, providing for full propulsion power from sea level to
very high altitudes. The engine is a spark ignited gasoline engine,
pressurized with multiple stages of turbocharging. Compared to other engine
types, the ERAST power plant consumes less air relative to the amount of
power produced. The air is compressed and then cooled to room temperature
with large heat exchangers. The ERAST three stage turbocharged engine is
currently being prepared for testing in an altitude chamber, and will later be
tested in actual flights.
Another technical challenge is the solar-powered airplane, and its
energy-storage system. Ray Morgan, designer of the solar-powered Pathfinder
airplane:
MORGAN: To fly on solar power, it necessitates that the airplane be
extremely light or it won't work because we get relatively little power from
the sun for the area of the wing. And such an airplane inherently flies slowly
and is therefore very susceptible to turbulence. I think we've proven that the
design concept is within reasonable conditons operationally viable to fly up to
high altitudes and safely return it . The flight speed range is at sea level
between 24 and 33 feet per second, so the maximum speed in nautical terms is
about 20 knots at sea level. At 65,000 feet, the speed would be about 65 knots.
In theory we should be able to get the airplane to about 65, 000 feet in the
summer months in this area. And also, we hope to build an airplane about
twice this size that can stay up continuously by charging an energy storage
system during the day from the extra solar array that would be available and
using that power to maintain our altitude at night, and thereby stay up almost
continuously.
VO: Another technical focus for the ERAST Alliance is on improving the
science instruments that will be carried by the unpiloted aircrafts. The
objective is to make the instruments, also called sensors because they detect
atmospheric gases, lightweight and small.
WEGENER: Every pound we can knock off of payload is really 6Ib in terms of
structure and other support facilities on the aircraft. Miniaturized
instruments use less power, smaller generators, they generate less heat, less
need for cooling or heating; so its very much to the advantage of the science
community to go with smaller instruments, it really benefit the airframers, it
just makes a big difference all the way around.
VO: Already, NASA's sensor developers have dramatically reduced the
weight of certain instruments, for example, the Argus instrument which
measures N20 and methane gases, once weighed 2501bs, but today weighs only
50lb. Steve Wegener is hoping to further miniaturize the Argus, making it
no bigger than a shoebox, and weighing only 5lb.
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WEGENER: To make this quantum leap in downsizing, miniaturizing
instruments, its more than just a technological leap, its a mindshift, we need
to find new concepts, new approaches, in making these measurements. Right
now, it looks like were as far as you can go with optical instruments, given
pathtinks and attenuation you have bouncing lasers off of mirrors. We can
go to new concepts in making these measurements, and actually realize some
of these quantum efficiencies that we need to have truly miniaturized
instruments.
VO: Just as NASA hoped, working these sorts of problems together has
proven very effective for the members of the ERAST Alliance.
IV. PARTNERSHIP
MORGAN: First off, ERAST Alliance gives us the chance to start really
developing a sharing of information that wilt promote the industry of
unmanned aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft. What I'm hoping is this ERAST
Alliance, focusing on the primary mission of doing environmental research,
can be not only a good entity for achieiving those goals but also will promote
the industry of remotely piloted aircraft by making each of the constituent
companies better equipped by not having to learn everything the hard way.
They can benefit from each other's experience and then focus of the new :
problems that haven't been solved before.
RUTAN: Working with the ERAST Alliance, we've been able to share
ideas relative to flight control concepts, we've been able to share hardware
development, with flight control hardware, and also propulsion technologies,
and also our approaches to the ground station are ones that we've been able
to pass on to our other teammates.
SHANE: I've been able to pick up the phone and call a coUeage at AeroV,
Aurora, and General Atomics, and research a problem, find out what their
experiences have been, and been able to solve problems much more quickly
than otherwise we would have been able to do. I think its really been one of
the best things about the Alliance.
JENNY: I think it does give you a different way of doing things, especially
when you're looking at technologies that are much further reaching, to
where you need to have a group of people working together on a Program,
rather than a real defined set of requirements.
CLANCY: The whole idea behind ERAST is that we have an agreement
that allows us to share data, share our ideas in a way that's not competitive to
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each other and it turns out to be very constructive for the industry that is
trying to develop these unmanned aircraft for various reasons.
LANGFORD: The Alliance is an unusual experiment in how you take a
fundamentally free market system and make it cooperative in a way that
preserves the competitiveness of each of these four companies involved
here...they are arch enemies of each other in one respect, they compete against
each other, and yet they are all very small players in the world of aerospace
and the question is, how do you grow the next generation of aerospace
companies? It's an important thing for the country's economic development,
you don't want the governmet making choices about who is going to be a
winner and a loser, you get money but you don't, those are decisions you
want the marketplace to make. The U.S. has to find innovative ways to help
grow the next generation of the aerospace industry. ERAST is an important
innovative experiment in that direction.
RISA: When NASA first approached us and asked us to guide them in
forming the Alliance, they were very apprehensive about the companies'
willingness to work together. NASA was right. I remember my first meeting
with the companies. They all wanted to go it alone. They were prepared to
have competition where one, and only one company would be selected for
the task. They couldn't embrace cooperation. When I structured the
agreement between them and NASA, I really tried to address the concerns
they all had. It was a balancing act, but I feel we arrived at a flexible
arrangement that works. Over time, both NASA and the companies have
come to realize the benefits of partnering. And we were very excited when
they did, because it was immediately clear that this premier group could
jointly produce a fleet of reliable remotely piloted airplanes, and that would
open the door to civil and commercial uses of the airplanes. What we see is a
new industry in the making...
V. CIVIL & COMMERCIAL USES
VO: Indeed, the prospects abound for using UAV's in ways that are
important to everyday life. Ideal as platforms from which to view the earth,
UAVs offer immediate benefits to agriculture and other land management
interests.
BRASS: You can go right down the list: forestry applications, mapping
trees, mapping vegetation, looking for stress over large areas can be done
easily with RPA's. In the agricultural community, again, mapping crops,
looking for stress in crops, looking at productivity over large areas,. Its going
to be completely valuable not only to the farmers themselves, but to the
marketing community, how much we are producing and where that
production is being done. In disaster assessment, we see that RPA's can give
us the opportunity to took at a large event for a long time, for a long duration.
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Fire is an example. We can stare at a fire over a few days. Its giving us a more
complete look at it, where that ,fire is going, how the intensity is changing,
and if management is having a particular effect on a given fire event, or on a
confluence of fires.
VO: Consider the advantages remotely piloted airplanes represent to
communities that suffer damage from fires and other hazards. James Brass, a
frequent advisor to federal and state forestry and fire departments, discusses
fires in California:
BRASS: If you took at what is spent, quote, on an average, and this
would not be like 1993 when we had 17 major fires burning in Southern
California, the Office of Emergency Services spends between 35 and 40 million
a year, just in California on an average year. Now, if you took at major fire
events, like Yellowstone, 150 to 200 million dollars was spent over four
months trying to manage and mitigate that problem. If you look at the
money we've spent on particular fires in California, they are definately in the
millions. If you start adding up the damage: the Oakland hills fire was in the
billion to two billion dollar range.
If we had the ability I think RPAs will bring us to monitor those areas during
those days, we could stop those fires short. And that is the key to not
managing larger fires. Knowing where they are, detecting quickly... '
Disasters are important. California is probably not that unique. We may be
unique in that we have multiple types of disasters, but if you took at Florida
and any of the coastal areas, they may not have earthquakes, but they have
the same type of problems that we do with flooding, major mudslides,
certainly fires. These all can be brought to bear with RPA's...
VI. WRAP-UP
VO: The ERAST Alliance RPA's are beginning to make the skies
their home. Its a good thing, because they have important work to do. In
atmospheric testing, missions for RPA's are pressing.
BARRIOLLEAUX: NASA has been tasked by Congress to provide an
environmental assessment of the next generation of supersonic transports
that the aircraft and engine companies are just now trying to put some
preliminary design down. To me, that seems like a fairly important thing to
do. I'd love to be able to get in a mach 2.3 airplane and fly to Japan in half or a
third the time it takes now. But I don't know that I want to mess up the
ozone layer while I do that. So rather than spend billions of dolars and then
discover that its a problem, let's be proactive rather than reactive.
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VO: RPA's are an invaluable tool for reaching the stratosphere and relaying
findings to scientists. Whereas in the past, we have had to rely on manned
flights, which were often constrained to six flight hours to protect the pilot,
RPA's, with their ability to fly at altitude for days at a time, provide a new
dimension in scientific study of the atmosphere.
And, beyond science, here's a tool for commerce. A new platform for
telecommunications, for agriculture, a means to view the earth's surface with
a high degree of resolution not possible from satellites. And beyond
commerce, a tool for protecting lives, and property, and land from the threats
of hazards, such as fire. The ERAST Alliance remotely piloted airplanes are
well underway.
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ATTACHMENT 6
improved means for determining potential liabilities stemming from
radically changing weather conditions. In pursuing the industry's concerns,
receptivity toward a role for high altitude UAVs was identified by Dick
Wagaman (AUVS). Consequently, a collection of Alliance parties convened
to further investigate the value and feasibility of a functional relationship
between the ERAST Alliance and the insurance industry. The parties consist
mainly of Dick Wagaman, Dale Tietz (acting on behalf of the ERAST Alliance
generally), and Karen Robbins (AmTech). Kevin Robinson of General
Research Corporation was engaged by the Alliance to provide research and
expertise on insurance related requirements in scientific data collection and to
exploit advanced modeling and simulation capabilities to support the task.
The ERAST group met several times in 1996 with the leading scientific
advisor for the insurance industry, who had expressed considerable interest
in working with the ERAST Alliance to explore possible missions in the field
of cyclogenesis (cyclone storm formation). Further, at the behest of this same
advisor, the ERAST group also met with the country's foremost expert on
cyclogenesis, and gained his commitment to explore possible missions for
high altitude UAVs.
Based on input from these advisors, as well as their interactions with the
ERAST Group and other ERAST members (such as sensor lead Steve
Wegener and earth scientist Jim Brass (both of NASA ARC), discussion is
developing in regard to a specific possible campaign. Due to the importance
of understanding storm behavior--hurricane damage represents a major
economic threat to the United States and is of vital concern to the insurance
industry and all levels of government--a mission focused on hurricane
formation is under discussion. The mission, as currently outlined, would
involve UAV flights in the area of Cape Verde, the location where hurricanes
threatening the U.S. eastern seaboard have their inception. Careful
consideration of the merits of a mission and its feasibility is presently
underway. As a part of validating this interaction with the insurance
industry, there are tentative plans for the ERAST Alliance to sponsor a
follow-on, comprehensive meeting with key industry representatives (no
date has been set).
The ERAST group has also offered to explore the value of other possible
missions and to interact with prospective UAV end-users as the possibilities
emerge. Consequently, Dale Tietz has undertaken to review a possible earth
mapping mission which would involve UAV flight from Greenland, and is
proceeding in coordination with NASA Goddard's ice mapping mission.
The objective of the ERAST group is to study the value of particular missions
to the ERAST Alliance as an opportunity for demonstrating technology
performance and applications, to identify the benefits to end-users and
ERAST
COMMERCIALIZATION ACTIVITIES
Summary
Overview
A goal of the ERAST Program is the commercial application of technology
resulting from the work of the ERAST Alliance. This goal is sufficiently
primary to be called out in the recitals section of the ERAST Joint Sponsored
Research Agreement. In support of this goal, two activities described below
were commenced in 1996 to assess and explore commercial applications of
UAV technologies relevant to the ERAST Alliance.
L Assessment of UAV Commercialization Opportunities
To date, much of the business literature that addresses potential commercial
uses for UAVs has suggested the value of low to mid range altitude UAVs,
(i.e., up to 50,000 feet). Since ERAST is unquestionably dedicated to high
altitude UAV development, there is a specific need to address the potential
uses of higher flying UAVs. The ERAST Alliance commenced a study
focused on non-defense applications of high altitude UAVs in the latter part
of 1996. The study is led by Longitude 122 West, and performed principally by
that company's President and a subcontractor, Basil Papadales, an
acknowledged expert in UAVs. Basil is a key study team member as he has
extensive interaction with industry seeking commercial UAV applications.
The study will address potential UAV functions and end-users, as well as
reveal how UAVs may be positioned to perform potential functions relative
to other competing systems. The study will also recommend particular
functions best suited to the type of aircraft being developed by the ERAST
Alliance, and will delineate specific aircraft design guidelines required to
perform designated functions.
The study is expected to be completed by Spring of 1997.
1I. Exploration of Technology Application Areas
In addition to the assessment of potential functional areas for higher altitude
UAVs, the ERAST Alliance also sought to explore particular missions where
end-users expressed interest in high altitude UAV capabilities. It was learned
in late 1996 that segments of the insurance industry were searching for
cultivate their interest, if appropriate, and assess the feasibility of the
mission(s).
All activities of the ERAST group are being coordinated with Longitude 122
West, and reported to the ERAST Project Manager, Jenny Baer-Riedhart. A
full report to the members of the ERAST Alliance will be provided at the first
1997 ERAST Alliance business meeting.
